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Abstract—Data attacks on state estimation modify part of sys-
tem measurements such that the tempered measurements cause
incorrect system state estimates. Attack techniques proposed
in the literature often require detailed knowledge of system
parameters. Such information is difficult to acquire in practice.
The subspace methods presented in this paper, on the other
hand, learn the system operating subspace from measurements
and launch attacks accordingly. Conditions for the existence of
an unobservable subspace attack are obtained under the full
and partial measurement models. Using the estimated system
subspace, two attack strategies are presented. The first strategy
aims to affect the system state directly by hiding the attack vector
in the system subspace. The second strategy misleads the bad data
detection mechanism so that data not under attack are removed.
Performance of these attacks are evaluated using the IEEE 14-
bus network and the IEEE 118-bus network.
Index Terms—State estimation, subspace method, false data
injection, data framing attack, cyber physical system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cyber physical system (CPS) [1] is a collection of physical
devices networked by a cyber infrastructure with integrated
sensing, communications, and control. A defining feature of
CPS is coordinated operations based on data collected from
sensors deployed throughout the system. Major examples of
CPS include power grids, intelligent transportation systems,
and networked robotics.
An essential signal processing component of many CPSs
is real-time state estimation based on sensor measurements
[2]. The state estimate provides a CPS with the real-time
monitoring and control capability. For instance, the state esti-
mate of a power grid facilitates real-time economic dispatch,
contingency analysis, and computation of real-time electricity
price [2].
The dependency of CPS on data communications makes it
vulnerable to cyber attacks where an adversary may break into
the network, collect unauthorized information, and intercept
and alter sensor data. Because measurements are collected
over a wide geographical area by distributed data acquisition
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systems, sometimes through wireless links, communications
networks that support modern CPSs have numerous points of
vulnerabilities [3], [4]. For critical infrastructures such as a
power grid, a well planned coordinated attack may lead to a
cascading failure and a regional blackout [5].
To assess vulnerability of CPS to possible cyber attacks, it is
important to study potential attack mechanisms. In this paper,
we consider an adversary who can modify certain sensor data
such that the corrupted data will mislead the CPS control with
a wrong state estimate. We refer to such a data attack on state
estimation as a state attack. A major challenge of state attack
is to avoid being detected and identified by the fusion center.
In the literature, successful state attacks on a CPS, in par-
ticular a power grid, have been reported. Liu, Ning, and Reiter
[6] presented the first state attack strategy, where an adversary
replaces part of “normal” sensor data with “malicious data.”
They showed that if an adversary can control a sufficiently
large number of sensor data, it can perturb the state estimate
by an arbitrary degree while avoiding detection at the control
center. Subsequent works along this line uncovered numerous
attack and protection mechanisms [7]–[14].
Most proposed attack schemes require considerably detailed
system information. In particular, the network topology and
physical system parameters are often required to construct
attacks. Although such information may be obtained by pen-
etrating the control center, security measures can make it
difficult in practice to access such information.
A. Summary of contributions
We consider the problem of data-driven attacks on state es-
timation, assuming that the adversary is capable of monitoring
a subset of system measurements without detailed knowledge
of the network topology and system parameters. The key
idea in the proposed approach is to exploit the subspace
structure of the measurements, in the same spirit of subspace
techniques in array processing [15], beamforming [16], and
system identification [17].
The main contribution of this paper is the development of
subspace techniques for state attack. To this end, we present
two techniques with different characteristics. First, we show a
construction of an unobservable attack based on the estimated
subspace structure of measurements. We show further that, in
constructing the attack, under certain conditions, monitoring
only partial measurements may be sufficient. In particular, we
present a graph theoretic condition for the existence of an
unobservable attack under the partial measurement model.
The second subspace-based attack exploits the bad data
detection and removal mechanisms. In particular, the attack
2purposely triggers the bad data detection, but it is designed to
mislead the fusion center to remove data that are not tempered
by the adversary while keeping some of the falsified data. After
such data removal, although the remaining data appear to be
consistent with the system model, the resulting state estimate
may have an arbitrarily large error. We refer to this type of
attack as data framing attack in the sense that valid data are
“framed” by the adversary and removed incorrectly by the
fusion center.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks, we con-
sider the problem of state estimation in a power system as a
practical example of CPS. To this end, we consider the IEEE
14-bus network and the IEEE 118-bus network [18].
An additional complexity of the power system is that the
system observation is a nonlinear function of the system state.
This raises the issue of whether attacks constructed from a
linear model is effective in a nonlinear system. While we do
not have theoretical guarantees, simulation results show that
the subspace-based data attacks perform well in the presence
of nonlinearity in system equations.
B. Related work and organization
This paper extends some of the key results on state attacks
that assume that the system parameters and the network
topology are known to the attacker. We describe below some
of the relevant techniques.
There is a substantial literature on state attacks when the
system parameter and the network topology are known. Liu,
Ning, and Reiter [6] first introduced an unobservable attack
on power system state estimation, which can perturb the state
estimate without being detected by the bad data detector at
the fusion center. Following their seminal work, the link be-
tween feasibility of an unobservable attack and power system
observability was made in [7], [8]. Consequently, classical
power system observability conditions [19] can be modified to
check feasibility of unobservable attacks and used to develop
countermeasures based on sensor data authentication [7]–[10],
[12], [20], [21]. To assess the grid vulnerability against data
attacks, the minimum number of adversary-controlled sensors
necessary for an unobservable attack was suggested as the
security index of the grid [8], [22]. The data framing attack,
when the system parameters are known, was first proposed in
[23] to circumvent the fundamental limit posed by the security
index.
There is limited work on state attacks without system
information or with partial system information. The use of
independent component analysis in [13] is the most relevant.
The authors of [13] proposed to identify a mixing matrix
from which to construct an unobservable attack. However,
such techniques require that loads are statistically indepen-
dent and non-Gaussian, and the techniques need full sensor
observations. Generating unobservable attacks using partial
parameter information was considered in [14]. The authors
in [14] showed that an adversary knowing impedance of
transmission lines in a cutset of the network topology can
construct an unobservable attack. However, how an adversary
can learn local parameters is nontrivial. In contrast to the
aforementioned approaches, our method requires no system
parameter information, and it can be launched with only partial
sensor observations.
Attacks were also studied in the framework of a general dy-
namic CPS, under the assumption of an omniscient adversary.
For instance, an attack on a linear control system equipped
with a linear-quadratic-Gaussian controller was studied in [24].
Detectability and identifiability of attacks on general CPS
operations was characterized in [25]. The model considered
in these papers is more general than the static model studied
here. However, their assumption of an adversary with complete
system information is stronger than that in the present work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the measurement model, the mathematical model of
state estimation and bad data processing, and the attack model.
Section III presents the subspace methods of unobservable
attack, and Section IV presents the subspace methods of data
framing attack. In Section V, the results from simulations
with benchmark power grids are presented. Finally, Section VI
provides concluding remarks.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
A. Notations
An upper case boldface letter (e.g., H) denotes a matrix,
a lower case boldface letter (e.g., x) denotes a vector, and a
script letter (e.g., A, S) denotes a set. The entry of H at the ith
row and the jth column is denoted by Hij , and the ith entry
of x is denoted by xi. In addition, R(H) and N(H) denote
the column space and the null space of H respectively. And,
I denotes an identity matrix with an appropriate size.
B. Measurement model
The system state of a CPS is defined as a vector of variables
that characterize the current operating condition of the CPS.
We assume centralized state estimation at the fusion center.
For real-time estimation of the system state x ∈ Rn, the
fusion center collects measurements from sensors deployed
throughout the system. Generally, the sensor measurements
are related to the system state x in a nonlinear fashion, and
the relation can be described by the nonlinear measurement
model (e.g., the AC model for a power grid [26]):
z = h(x) + e, (1)
where z ∈ Rm is the measurement vector, h(·) is the
measurement function, and e is the Gaussian measurement
noise.
If some sensors malfunction or an adversary injects mali-
cious data, the fusion center observes biased measurements,
z¯ = h(x) + e+ a, (2)
where a represents a deterministic bias. In such a case, the data
are said to be bad, and the biased sensor entries are referred
to as bad data entries. The bad data vector is typically sparse,
and its support is unknown to the fusion center. If a is injected
by an adversary, a is constrained by its support.
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Fig. 1. State estimation and bad data processing
In analyzing the attack effect on state estimation, we adopt
a linearization of (1) around a nominal state x0:
z = h(x0) +H(x− x0) + e, (3)
where H ∈ Rm×n is the measurement matrix that relates the
system state to the measurement vector, and e is the Gaussian
measurement noise with a covariance matrix σ2I. Without loss
of generality, we assume that both h(x0) and x0 are zero
vectors1 and employ the following model:
z = Hx+ e. (4)
A system is said to be observable if the measurement
matrix H has full column rank (i.e., x can be uniquely
determined from Hx.) System observability is essential for
state estimation. In practice, sensors should be placed in the
network to satisfy observability. Hence, we assume that the
CPS of interest is observable, i.e., H has full column rank.
In practice, the nonlinear system and the nonlinear iterative
state estimation techniques have a certain mitigating effect on
attacks designed based on a linear model [27]. It is therefore
important to validate performance of an attack strategy based
on the nonlinear model (1) using a nonlinear state estimator.
Note that, while our attacks are constructed based on (4), our
numerical experiments validate their performance using the
original nonlinear system (1) with a nonlinear state estimator.
C. State estimation and bad data processing
This section introduces a popular approach to state estima-
tion and bad data processing [26], [28], which we assume to
be employed by the fusion center. The specific approach is a
widely used standard implementation in the power grid where
the number of states is in the order of 10,000, and the estimates
are made every few minutes.
Fig. 1 illustrates an iterative scheme for obtaining an esti-
mate xˆ of the system state, which consists of three functional
blocks: state estimation, bad data detection, and bad data
identification.
The assumed state estimator is based on the maximum
likelihood principle and is implemented in a recursive manner.
Iterations begin with the initial measurement vector z(1) , z
and the initial measurement function h(1) , h where the
superscript denotes the index for the current iteration.
1For general cases, we can simply treat z1 , z−h(x0) and x1 , x−x0
as the measurement vector and the state vector and work with z1 = Hx1+e.
In the kth iteration, state estimation uses (z(k), h(k)) as an
input and calculates the least squares (LS) estimate of the
system state and the corresponding residue vector:
xˆ(k) , argminx
1
σ2
‖z(k) − h(k)(x)‖22,
r(k) , z(k) − h(k)(xˆ(k)),
(5)
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes l2 norm. In practice, the above nonlinear
LS estimate can be obtained by iteration of a linearized LS
estimation using Newton-Raphson or quasi-Newton methods
[26].
Bad data detection employs the J(xˆ)-test [26], [28]:

bad data if 1
σ2
‖r(k)‖22 > τ
(k);
good data if 1
σ2
‖r(k)‖22 ≤ τ
(k)
(6)
where τ (k) is a predetermined threshold. The J(xˆ)-test is
widely used due to its simplicity and the fact that the test
statistic has a χ2 distribution if the data are good [28]. The
latter fact is used to set the threshold τ (k) for a given false
alarm constraint.
If the bad data detector (6) declares that the data are good,
the algorithm returns the state estimate xˆ(k) and terminates.
However, if the bad data detector declares that the data are
bad, bad data identification is invoked to identify and remove
one bad data entry from the measurement vector.
A widely used criterion for identifying a bad data entry is
the normalized residue [26], [28]: each r(k)i is divided by its
standard deviation under the hypothesis that z(k) contains no
bad data. Therefore, each normalized residue approximately
follows the standard normal distribution if z(k) contains no
bad data. Specifically,
r˜(k) , Ω(k)r(k), (7)
where Ω(k) is a diagonal matrix with
Ω
(k)
ii ,


0
if removing i makes
the system unobservable2;
1√
σ2W
(k)
ii
otherwise;
(8)
and W(k) is defined as
I−H(k)((H(k))TH(k))−1(H(k))
T (9)
with H(k) denoting the Jacobian of h(k) at xˆ(k) (see Appendix
of [28] for details.)
Once the normalized residue r˜(k) is calculated, the sensor
with the largest |r˜(k)i | is identified as a bad sensor. The row
of z(k) and the row of h(k) that correspond to the bad sensor
are removed, and the updated measurement vector z(k+1) and
measurement function h(k+1) are used as the inputs for the
next iteration.
2If removing the sensor i makes the system unobservable, its residue is
always equal to zero [26], and the corresponding diagonal entry of W(k) is
zero. For such a sensor, the normalizing factor is 0 such that its normalized
residue is equal to 0.
4Using the linearized model (4), every step is the same as
using the nonlinear model, except that the nonlinear measure-
ment function h(k)(x) is replaced with the linear function
H(k)x (so, the Jacobian is the same everywhere.) Note that
the LS state estimate (5) is replaced with a simple linear LS
solution:
xˆ(k) = ((H(k))TH(k))−1(H(k))
T
z(k), (10)
and thus
r(k) = z(k) −H(k)xˆ(k) =W(k)z(k). (11)
D. Adversary model
An adversary is assumed to be capable of modifying the data
from a subset of sensors SA, referred to as adversary sensors.
The fusion center observes corrupted measurements z¯ instead
of the real measurements z. The adversarial modification is
mathematically modeled by:
z¯ = z+ a, a ∈ A, (12)
where a is an attack vector, and A is the set of feasible attack
vectors defined as
A , {a ∈ Rm : ai = 0, ∀i /∈ SA}. (13)
Liu, Ning, and Reiter [6] presented an unobservable attack,
which is a powerful attack mechanism capable of perturbing
the state estimate without being detected. An unobservable
attack can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.1: Given a measurement vector z correspond-
ing to a state x, i.e., z = Hx + e, a state attack a ∈ A
is unobservable if there exists a state x¯ 6= x such that
z+ a = Hx¯+ e.
The following Lemma shows the algebraic property of the
attack; it follows immediately from the definition.
Lemma 2.1: A state attack is unobservable if and only if
a 6= 0, and a ∈ R(H)∩A. Furthermore, if a is unobservable,
so is γ · a for any nonzero γ ∈ R, and ‖x − x¯‖2 → ∞ as
γ →∞.
The feasibility of an unobservable attack is closely related to
the concept of system observability. In particular, the following
connection was found in [8].
Theorem 2.1 ([8]): An unobservable attack is feasible if
and only if removing the adversary sensors makes the grid
unobservable (i.e., the measurement matrix does not have full
column rank.)
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. SUBSPACE METHODS FOR UNOBSERVABLE ATTACK
Most existing works on an unobservable attack assumed that
an adversary knows the measurement matrix H. In contrast,
this section presents a design of an unobservable attack based
on the system measurement subspace, without knowledge of
H. Employing the linearized measurement model (4), we will
present the conditions under which an unobservable attack
can be constructed based on the subspace information. We
also demonstrate a condition that guarantees the design of an
unobservable attack based on partial sensor measurements; for
an attack on a power grid, this condition is characterized as a
graph condition on the network topology.
A. Feasibility of an unobservable attack
Note that designing an unobservable attack is equivalent
to finding a nonzero vector in R(H) satisfying the sparsity
pattern defined by A. Therefore, an unobservable attack, if
feasible, can be launched by using a basis matrix U ∈ Rm×n
of R(H) without knowing H, as stated in the following
theorem. Formally, we refer to R(H) as the measurement
subspace because it is the subspace of all possible noiseless
measurements.
Theorem 3.1: Let U be any basis matrix of R(H) and U¯ a
submatrix of U obtained by removing the rows corresponding
to the adversary sensors. Then, the following are true:
1) An unobservable attack is feasible if and only if U¯ does
not have full column rank.
2) When feasible, an unobservable attack can be con-
structed using U: for a nonzero vector v ∈ N(U¯),
a , Uv is an unobservable attack vector.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that in constructing the unobservable attack vectorUv,
all that is necessary is a basis matrix U of R(H).
B. Unobservable attack with partial measurements
In this section, we show that an unobservable attack can be
constructed using the subspace information of partial sensor
measurements. To formally state the result, we need the notion
of a critical set of sensors [26] and partial observability defined
as follows.
Definition 3.1: A set of sensors is called a critical set if
removing the set of sensors from the system renders the system
unobservable while removing any strict subset of it does not.
Let S and X denote a subset of sensors and a subset of state
variables respectively. The state variables in X are said to be
observable with respect to S if the state variables in X can be
uniquely determined based on measurements from S3. When
the state variables in X are observable with respect to S, a
subset C of S is a critical set with respect to (S,X) if removing
C from S makes the state variables in X no longer observable
with respect to S while removing a strict subset of C from S
does not.
Consider a subset of sensors So. Let Xo denote the set of
state variables whose values affect measurements from the
sensors in So (i.e., the |So| by n submatrix Ho of H, consisting
of the rows corresponding to the sensors in So, has nonzero
columns exactly at the columns corresponding to the state
variables in Xo.)
3In other words, every element of N(Hs) has zero entries for the rows
corresponding to the state variables in X, where Hs ∈ R|S|×n is the
submatrix of H obtained by retaining only the rows corresponding to the
sensors in S.
5The following theorem provides the conditions under which
an unobservable attack can be constructed based on the sub-
space information of measurements from So. The conditions
roughly mean that (i) based on measurements from So, one can
uniquely identify the relevant state variables (i.e., the variables
in Xo,) and (ii) So contains a set of sensors, which, if controlled
by an adversary, is sufficient for launching an unobservable
attack and is also critical with respect to (So,Xo).
Theorem 3.2: Suppose that
1) the state variables in Xo are observable with respect to
So,
2) C ⊂ So is a critical set with respect to (So,Xo), and
3) removing C makes the system unobservable.
Let Ho ∈ R|So|×n denote the submatrix of H obtained by
retaining only the rows corresponding to the sensors in So.
Then, the following are true:
1) Let Ao denote the set of vectors in R(Ho) such that
b ∈ R(Ho) is in Ao if and only if the rows of b
corresponding to the sensors in So \C are equal to zero.
Then, the dimension of Ao is one.
2) For an arbitrary nonzero ao ∈ Ao, the attack that modi-
fies the sensor data from C by adding the corresponding
entries in ao to the real data is unobservable.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that Ao in Theorem 3.2 can be fully characterized
based on a basis matrix of R(Ho). The following corollary
provides the detail of how an attack can be constructed from
a basis matrix of R(Ho).
Corollary 3.2.1: Suppose that the conditions 1), 2), and 3)
of Theorem 3.2 hold. Let Uo ∈ R|So|×|Xo| denote a basis
matrix of R(Ho) and U¯o denote a submatrix of Uo obtained
by removing the rows corresponding to the sensors in C. Then,
the following are true:
1) The dimension of N(U¯o) is one.
2) For any nonzero vector v ∈ N(U¯o), the attack that mod-
ifies the sensor data from C by adding the corresponding
entries in Uov to the real data is unobservable.
The three conditions of Theorem 3.2 are all related to
system observability or partial observability. In case of a power
grid, system observability and partial observability can be
checked based on partial information about the grid topol-
ogy and sensor locations. In particular, the graph-theoretical
observability criterion in [19] can be employed.
A power grid is a network of buses connected by transmis-
sion lines. The topology of a grid is naturally defined as an
undirected graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of buses, and
E is the set of connected transmission lines: {i, j} is in E if
and only if there exists a connected transmission line between
bus i and bus j. We consider two types of legacy sensors:
line flow sensors and bus injection sensors. A line flow sensor
located on a line {i, j} measures the power flowing through
the line either from bus i to bus j or from bus j to bus i. A
bus injection sensor on bus i measures the total power injected
into the network at bus i (see Appendix F for the details of
the sensor measurements.)
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Fig. 2. A part of the IEEE 118-bus network: Rectangles represent the sensor
locations. Every bus has an injection sensor, and every line has line flow
sensors for both directions.
The following corollary presents the graph conditions that
imply the conditions of Theorem 3.2 for an attack on a
power grid state estimation. Appendix F provides the details
of the graph-theoretical observability criterion in [19], which
directly results in the following corollary from Theorem 3.2.
To state the corollary, we need to introduce the concept of
a reduced power network. Given a subset So of sensors, the
reduced network consists of the sensors in So and the topology
G¯ = (V¯, E¯), where {i, j} is in E¯ if and only if a line flow sensor
on {i, j} is in So, or an injection sensor at bus i or bus j is
in So, and V¯ consists of all the endpoints of the lines in E¯.
For instance, in the IEEE 118-bus network, Fig. 2 describes a
reduced network for So consisting of the circled sensors. In this
example, the vertices and edges inside the dashed boundary
form G¯.
Corollary 3.2.2: Let So be a subset of sensors, G¯ = (V¯, E¯)
the topology of the reduced network for So, and C a subset of
So. Suppose that
1) There exists a cut of the grid topology G such that C
consists of all line flow sensors on the cutset lines and
all injection sensors on the endpoints of the cutset lines.
2) For every sensor s in C, there exists a way to assign
each injection sensor in (So \C)∪{s} to a line incident
to the bus where the sensor is located4 such that there
exists a spanning tree of G¯ with at least one sensor in
(So \ C) ∪ {s} on every edge of the tree (either a line
flow or an assigned injection sensor.)
Then, the conditions of Theorem 3.2 hold, and thus the
statements in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.2.1 hold.
Note that the conditions of Corollary 3.2.2 are related to
the topology and the sensor locations in the reduced network.
Therefore, an adversary can exploit partial information about
the topology and sensor locations to find an attack setting that
4In other words, for an injection sensor located at bus i, we assign the
injection sensor to one of the lines that are incident to bus i. We do this for
each injection sensor in (So \ C) ∪ {s}.
6enables an unobservable attack with partial sensor observa-
tions. For instance, it can be easily checked that the example
in Fig. 2 with C consisting of the circled empty-rectangle
sensors satisfies the conditions. In particular, the first condition
is satisfied with the cut that isolates bus 115 from the rest of
the network.
C. Subspace attack algorithm
All the information necessary for subspace attack methods
is the subspace information of R(H) or R(Ho). Subspace
estimation based on measurement data has been actively
studied in the signal processing literature (e.g., [29], [30]),
and thus subspace methods naturally lead to a data-driven
algorithm for practical attack scenarios. Our focus in this
section is to demonstrate how (any) subspace estimator can
be used to generate a data-driven attack.
One of the simplest yet effective ways of estimating a basis
matrix is to use a sample covariance matrix. Let z1, . . . , zK
denote measurement vectors at K different sampling instances:
zi = Hxi + ei, i = 1, . . . , K. (14)
For simplicity, suppose that the noise vectors e1, . . . , eK are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the state vec-
tors x1, . . . , xK are i.i.d. with a positive definite covariance
matrix Σx, and the noise vectors and the state vectors are
uncorrelated. Then, the covariance matrix of z is
Σz , E
[
(z1 − E[z1])(z1 − E[z1])
T
]
= HΣxH
T + σ2I.
(15)
Note that HΣxHT has rank n. Therefore, if UΛVT is a
singular value decomposition (SVD) of Σz, the n columns of
U that correspond to the n largest singular values form a basis
of R(HΣxHT ). Because R(HΣxHT ) is equivalent to R(H),
the same columns form a basis of R(H).
Therefore, in practice, we can estimate a basis matrix of
R(H) by applying SVD to the sample covariance matrix Σˆz:
Σˆz ,
1
K − 1
K∑
i=1
(zi − z)(zi − z)
T , (16)
where z denotes the sample mean.
Based on the above (or any other) subspace estimator and
Theorem 3.1, the data-driven attack with full sensor observa-
tions operates as follows with the observations {z1, . . . , zK}
and the adversary sensor set SA as inputs:
1) Subspace estimation: Based on {z1, . . . , zK}, calculate
an estimate Uˆ ∈ Rm×n of a basis matrix of R(H).
2) Null space estimation: Obtain Uˆ1 by removing the rows
of Uˆ that correspond to the sensors in SA. Find an SVD
of Uˆ1, Uˆ1 = U˜Λ˜V˜T , and let v denote the column of V˜
that corresponds to the smallest singular value (v is an
estimate of a nonzero element of N(U¯) in Theorem 3.1.)
3) Attack: Modify the sensor data from SA by adding the
corresponding entries of η · Uˆv to them, where η ∈ R
is a scaling factor to adjust the degree of perturbation.
The data-driven attack with partial sensor observations
can be constructed in the same manner based on Corol-
lary 3.2.1. Specifically, the attack receives (Xo, So,C) and
{z˜1, . . . , z˜K}—the set of measurements from the sensors in
So at K different time instances—as inputs and executes the
following steps:
1) Subspace estimation: Based on {z˜1, . . . , z˜K}, calculate
an estimate Uˆo ∈ R|So|×|Xo| of a basis matrix of R(Ho).
2) Null space estimation: Obtain Uˆc by removing the
rows of Uˆo that correspond to the sensors in C. Find an
SVD of Uˆc: Uˆc = U˜Λ˜V˜T . Let v denote the column
of V˜ that corresponds to the smallest singular value
(v is an estimate of a nonzero element of N(U¯o) in
Corollary 3.2.1.)
3) Attack: Modify the sensor data from C by adding the
corresponding entries of η · Uˆov to them, where η ∈ R
is a scaling factor to adjust the degree of perturbation.
IV. SUBSPACE METHODS FOR DATA FRAMING ATTACK
The idea of data framing attack based on full system pa-
rameter information was first presented in [23]. In this section,
we demonstrate data-driven approaches of data framing attack
by exploiting the subspace structure of sensor measurements.
A. Data framing attack
A data framing attack aims to enable an adversary to
perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree even when
an unobservable attack with SA does not exist. To this end,
a data framing attack frames some normally operating meters
as sources of bad data such that their data will be removed. A
critical parameter of data framing attack is the set of sensors to
be framed, denoted by SF. The framed sensor set SF is selected
such that SF ∩ SA = ∅, and if the sensors in SF are removed
from the system, an unobservable attack with SA becomes
feasible. Under this selection rule, an adversary may design
an attack that becomes unobservable once the sensor data from
SF are removed by the bad data removal rule.
To successfully make the data from SF removed, one can use
an attack vector that maximizes the energy of the normalized
residues at SF in the first iteration of the bad data processing.
Such an attack design does not necessarily guarantee that all
data from SF will be identified as bad. Nevertheless, this is a
reasonable heuristic to circumvent the difficulty of analyzing
attack effect on normalized residues in all iterations.
To simplify notation, we drop the superscript that denotes
the first iteration of bad data processing: all the quantities
in this section are from the first iteration unless otherwise
specified. The attack direction that maximizes the energy of
the normalized residues in the first iteration can be constructed
by solving the following optimization [23]:
maxa E
[∑
i∈SF
(r˜i)
2
]
subj. ‖a‖22 = 1, a ∈ R(H1) ∩A, (17)
where H1 ∈ Rm×n is a matrix obtained from H by replacing
the rows corresponding to the sensors in SF with zero row
vectors. The constraint a ∈ R(H1) holds if and only if a is
unobservable after the framed sensor data are removed. This
constraint guarantees that once the data from SF are removed,
the attack can have the same effect as an unobservable attack.
7The following theorem states that a solution to (17) can be
obtained without knowing H if we know a basis matrix of
R(H).
Theorem 4.1: An adversary knowing a basis matrix U ∈
R
m×n of R(H) can find a solution of (17). Specifically, a
solution to the following quadratically constrained quadratic
programming (QCQP) is also a solution to (17), and vice versa:
maxa ‖ISFΩ˜W˜a‖
2
2
subj. ‖a‖22 = 1, a ∈ R(U1) ∩A, (18)
where ISF ∈ R|SF|×m is the row selection operator that retains
only the rows corresponding to the sensors in SF out of m
rows,
W˜ , I−U(UTU)−1UT , (19)
Ω˜ ∈ Rm×m is a diagonal matrix with
Ω˜ii =
{
1/
√
W˜ii if W˜ii > 0;
0 if W˜ii = 0,
(20)
and U1 ∈ Rm×n is a matrix obtained from U by replacing
the rows corresponding to the sensors in SF with zero row
vectors.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that addition of the attack vector a changes the mean
of the residue vector from 0 to W˜a. And, ISFΩ˜W˜a/σ is the
resulting mean of the normalized residues of the data from SF.
B. Sufficiency of partial measurements
Similar to sufficiency of partial measurements for an un-
observable attack (Theorem 3.2), data framing attack can
also be launched based on subspace information of partial
measurements, as stated formally in the following theorem.
Below, we use the notations defined in Section III-B for the
partial measurement case.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose that the conditions 1), 2), and 3) of
Theorem 3.2 hold for So, Xo, and C. Let {C1, C2} denote
an arbitrary partition of C. Let HA denote a submatrix of H
consisting of the rows corresponding to the sensors in So \C2,
UA ∈ R|So\C2|×|Xo| denote a basis matrix of R(HA), and U¯A
denote a submatrix of UA obtained by removing the rows
corresponding to the sensors in C1. Then, the following are
true:
1) The dimension of N(U¯A) is one.
2) For a nonzero vector v ∈ N(U¯A), the attack that modi-
fies the sensor data from C1 by adding the corresponding
entries in UAv to the real data is equivalent to using
α · a∗ as an attack vector, where α is a nonzero real
number, and a∗ is an optimal solution to (17) with
(SA, SF) = (C1,C2).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Theorem 4.2 implies that knowledge of a basis matrix
of R(HA)—the subspace of measurements from So \ C2—is
sufficient for launching a data framing attack with (SA, SF) =
(C1,C2). Note that Theorem 4.2 requires the same conditions
as Theorem 3.2. Therefore, for an attack on a power grid, the
graph conditions in Corollary 3.2.2 can replace the conditions
of Theorem 4.2.
C. Subspace data framing attack algorithm
Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 guarantee the sufficiency
of subspace information in constructing data framing attacks.
Similar to the data-driven algorithms for unobservable attacks,
we can incorporate a subspace estimator and SVD to build a
data-driven algorithm for data framing attacks.
The data-driven framing attack with full sensor observations
receives sensor observations {z1, . . . , zK} at K different time
instances and (SA, SF) as inputs, and it has two small positive
parameters ǫ1 and ǫ2 for thresholding rules. Based on the
QCQP formulation (18), it works as follows:
1) Subspace estimation: Based on {z1, . . . , zK}, calculate
an estimate Uˆ ∈ Rm×n of a basis matrix of R(H).
2) Null space estimation: Obtain Uˆ1 by removing the rows
of Uˆ that correspond to the sensors in SA ∪ SF. Find an
SVD of Uˆ1: Uˆ1 = U˜Λ˜V˜T . Let Vˆ denote the matrix
consisting of the columns of V˜ whose corresponding
singular values are less than ǫ1. Let UˆA ∈ Rm×n
be the matrix obtained from Uˆ by replacing the rows
corresponding to the sensors not in SA with zero row
vectors. Then, UˆAVˆ is an estimate of a basis matrix of
R(U1) ∩A in (18)5.
3) QCQP parameter estimation: Calculate
Wˆ , I− Uˆ(UˆT Uˆ)−1UˆT (21)
and Ωˆ ∈ Rm×m, which is a diagonal matrix with
Ωˆii =
{ √
1/Wˆii if Wˆii > ǫ2;
0 if Wˆii < ǫ2.
(22)
4) QCQP: Solve maximizing ‖ISFΩˆWˆUˆAVˆy‖22 subject to
‖UˆAVˆy‖22 = 1 and y ∈ Rk, where k is the number of
columns of Vˆ. Let y∗ denote the solution.
5) Attack: Modify the sensor data from SA by adding the
corresponding entries of η ·UˆAVˆy∗ to them, where η ∈
R is a scaling factor to adjust the degree of perturbation.
Based on Theorem 4.2, the data-driven framing attack
with partial sensor observations receives (Xo, So,C1,C2) and
{z˜1, . . . , z˜K}—the set of measurements from the sensors in
So \ C2 at K different time instances—as inputs and executes
the following steps:
1) Subspace estimation: Based on {z˜1, . . . , z˜K}, calculate
an estimate UˆA ∈ R|SO\C2|×|XO| of a basis matrix of
R(HA).
2) Null space estimation: Obtain Uˆc by removing the rows
of UˆA that correspond to the sensors in C1. Find an
SVD of Uˆc: Uˆc = U˜Λ˜V˜T . Let v denote the column
of V˜ that corresponds to the smallest singular value
5A basis matrix of R(U1) ∩ A in (18) can be found by noting that
a ∈ R(U1) ∩ A if and only if a = U1y for some y ∈ N(U2) where
U2 ∈ R(m−|SA∪SF|)×n is a submatrix of U obtained by removing the rows
corresponding to the sensors in SA∪SF. In other words, given a basis matrix
B of N(U2), U1B is a basis matrix of R(U1) ∩ A.
8(v is an estimate of a nonzero element of N(U¯A) in
Theorem 4.2.)
3) Attack: Modify the sensor data from C1 by adding the
corresponding entries of η · UˆAv to them, where η ∈ R
is a scaling factor to adjust the degree of perturbation.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulations with benchmark power grids, the
IEEE 14-bus network and the IEEE 118-bus network, demon-
strate the performance of data-driven attacks. The nonlinear
measurement model (1) and the nonlinear state estimator were
employed to emulate practical power system state estimation.
The power system measurement model is briefly described in
Appenidx F. As an attack performance metric, we used the
l2 norm of the mean state estimation error, i.e., E[‖xˆ− x‖2],
where xˆ is the state estimate, and x is the true state.
A. Simulation methods
In each Monte Carlo run, we used the nonlinear model (1)
to generate measurement vectors. State vectors at different
time points were assumed to be independent and identically
distributed Gaussian random vectors with the mean equal to
the operating states given in the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus data
[18]. The means are far from the nominal state that is generally
used in a power system to obtain the linearized model (4). The
threshold of the bad data detector (i.e., the J(xˆ)-test) was set
to satisfy the false alarm constraint 0.04.
In each simulation scenario, we compared performance of
three attack methods: an attack with full knowledge of H, a
data-driven attack with full sensor observations, and a data-
driven attack with partial sensor observations. For data-driven
attacks, 1000 observations were used to estimate a basis matrix
of the subspace of (either full or partial) measurements; the
attacks employed the subspace estimator that uses the sample
covariance matrix as described in Section III-C. Both the 14-
bus network and the 118-bus network were assumed to be
fully measured; i.e., all bus injections and all line flows (in
both directions for each line) were measured by sensors.
B. Data-driven unobservable attack
1) IEEE 14-bus test: In the IEEE 14-bus network, we
considered an adversary controlling data from (1¯), (3¯), (4¯),
(5¯), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 5), (5, 1), (2, 5), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 2),
(4, 3), and (3, 4), as illustrated in Fig. 3: (¯i) denotes the
injection sensor at bus i, and (i, j) denotes the line flow
sensor measuring the power flow from i to j. Theorem 2.1
and the spanning tree observability criterion [19] imply that
the adversary is capable of launching an unobservable attack
(see Appendix F.) In addition, the adversary sensor set is also
a critical set, and thus all possible unobservable attack vectors
are aligned along the same direction (i.e., the dimension of
A ∩ R(H) is one.)
An adversary with partial sensor observations was assumed
to observe data from (1¯), (2¯), (3¯), (4¯), (5¯), (1, 2), (2, 1),
(1, 5), (5, 1), (2, 5), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 2), (3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 5),
(3, 2), (5, 6), (4, 7), and (4, 9). In this setting, the spanning
Fig. 3. IEEE 14-bus network: The circled empty rectangles represent the
adversary sensors (i.e., the sensors in SA). The adversary with partial sensor
observations can observe all the circled sensors.
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Fig. 4. Unobservable attacks on the 14-bus network: the sensor SNR is 46dB.
Attacks with the relative attack magnitudes 2, 4, 6, and 8 % were tested. For
each scenario, 1,000 Monte Carlo runs are used.
tree observability criterion can be used to verify that the
conditions of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied (see Appendix F,) and
thus an adversary with partial observations can construct an
unobservable attack under the linearized model assumption.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of unobservable attacks,
especially the plot of the normalized state estimation error
versus the relative attack magnitude (‖a‖1/‖z‖1). The mean
state estimation errors are normalized with respect to the mean
estimation error under the non-attack scenario. Both data-
driven attacks performed as well as the attack with knowledge
of H. The results indicate that even in a practical nonlinear
power system, the data-driven attacks designed based on the
linear model can perform well, and partial sensor observations
can provide sufficient information for designing an unobserv-
able attack.
2) IEEE 118-bus test: In the IEEE 118-bus simulation,
we considered unobservable attacks discussed in the example
in Fig. 2 of Section III-B. Fig. 5 shows the plots of the
normalized state estimation error versus the relative attack
magnitude. Three methods resulted in almost the same degree
of perturbation on the state estimate. The results demonstrate
that observing data from a small fraction of sensors can be
sufficient for launching an unobservable attack on a large
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Fig. 5. Unobservable attacks on the 118-bus network: the sensor SNR is
46dB. Attacks with the relative attack magnitudes 2, 4, and 6 % were tested.
For each scenario, 200 Monte Carlo runs are used.
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Fig. 6. Data framing attacks on the 14-bus network: the sensor SNR is 46dB.
Attacks with the relative attack magnitudes 1, 2, 3, and 4 % were tested. For
each scenario, 1,000 Monte Carlo runs are used.
system; only about 2 percent of sensors need to be observed.
C. Data-driven framing attack
1) IEEE 14-bus test: For data framing attacks, we con-
sidered an adversary who controls (4¯), (1, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2),
(4, 2), (4, 3), and (3, 4), and frames (1¯), (3¯), (5¯), (1, 2),
(2, 1), (2, 5), and (2, 4) as sources of bad data. Under this
setting, an adversary cannot launch an unobservable attack.
An adversary with partial observations was assumed to observe
data from (2¯), (4¯), (1, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (4, 2), (3, 4), (4, 3),
(4, 5), (3, 2), (5, 6), (4, 7), and (4, 9). This setting satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 4.2 and enables an adversary with
partial sensor observations to launch a data framing attack
under the linearized model assumption (see Appendix F.)
Fig. 6 shows the plots of the normalized state estimation
error versus the relative attack magnitude. The results show
that even when an unobservable attack is not feasible, an
adversary may exploit the idea of data framing to perturb
the state estimate by an arbitrary degree. Furthermore, the
results indicate that partial sensor observations are sufficient
for designing a data framing attack.
2) IEEE 118-bus test: We considered an adversary attack-
ing the part of the 118-bus network illustrated in Fig. 2.
The adversary was assumed to control (114, 115), (115, 114),
and (27, 115), and frame ( ¯114), ( ¯115), (2¯7), and (115, 27)
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Fig. 7. Data framing attacks on the 118-bus network: the sensor SNR is
46dB. Attacks with the relative attack magnitudes 0.8, 1.6, and 2.4 % were
tested. For each scenario, 200 Monte Carlo runs are used.
as sources of bad data. An adversary with partial sensor
observations was assumed to observe data from the circled
sensors in Fig. 2 except ( ¯114), ( ¯115), (2¯7), and (115, 27).
The graph conditions of Corollary 3.2.2 are satisfied, and thus
an adversary with partial observations is capable of launching
a data framing attack under the linearized model assumption.
Fig. 7 shows the plots of the normalized state estima-
tion error versus the relative attack magnitude. The results
demonstrate the sufficiency of partial sensor observations for
designing a data framing attack in a large network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents subspace methods of data attacks on
state estimators of cyber physical systems. By exploiting the
fact that subspace information of measurements is sufficient
for designing attacks, we devised data-driven attacks that
can be launched based on partial sensor observations. The
numerical results demonstrated that the data-driven attacks are
as efficient as the attacks based on full system information.
Our results demonstrate that one should not presumably
underestimate the ability of an adversary even when system
information is secure from the adversary. Even a leak of a
small fraction of certain sensor measurements may provide
enough data, upon which state attacks can be constructed.
Most countermeasures in the literature focused on protecting
certain sensor data from adversarial modification via data au-
thentication, while assuming that system parameters are known
to adversaries (e.g., [7], [9], [12], [20]). In case that system
parameter information is kept secure, our results demonstrate
that not only the ability to modify data but also the ability
to observe data are critical to an adversary. Therefore, as a
countermeasure, on top of a data authentication strategy, one
can strategically enhance data encryption and access control
protocols to limit the set of data an adversary may eavesdrop.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1
Let H¯ denote the measurement matrix after the sensors in
SA are removed; i.e., H¯ is obtained from H by removing the
rows corresponding to the adversary sensors. Then, Hy is in
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A if and only if y is in N(H¯)—the null space of H¯. This
implies that an unobservable attack is feasible if and only if
H¯ does not have full column rank (i.e., N(H¯) has a nonzero
dimension.)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The columns of U¯ span R(H¯). In addition, because U¯ and
H¯ have the same number of columns, U¯ does not have full
column rank if and only if H¯ does not have full column rank.
Therefore, Theorem 2.1 implies that an unobservable attack is
feasible if and only if U¯ does not have full column rank.
Suppose that an unobservable attack is feasible. Then, U¯ is
rank deficient, and we can find a nonzero vector v ∈ N(U¯).
With a , Uv, a is in A because Uv has zero entries for
the sensors not in SA (i.e., U¯v = 0). In addition, there exists
an invertible matrix B ∈ Rn×n such that H = UB, and
U = HB−1, because H has full column rank. Therefore,
Uv = H(B−1v), and thus a is an unobservable attack vector.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Let H¯ denote the submatrix of H obtained by removing
the rows corresponding to the sensors in C. Then, N(H¯) is
not null due to the third assumption. Let y denote a nonzero
vector in N(H¯) and yo denote a subvector of y obtained by
retaining only the rows corresponding to the state variables in
Xo. In addition, let Hs denote a submatrix of Ho obtained by
retaining only the columns corresponding to the state variables
in Xo (note that all the other columns of Ho are zero vectors.)
And, H¯s denotes a submatrix of Hs obtained by removing the
rows corresponding to the sensors in C.
First, note that ao ∈ Ao if and only if ao = Hsp for some
p ∈ N(H¯s). In addition, because C is a critical set with respect
to (So,Xo), N(H¯s) has dimension one. Note that H¯syo = 0
whereas Hsyo 6= 0. This implies that yo 6= 0, and {yo} is a
basis of N(H¯s). Therefore, {Hsyo} is a basis of Ao.
Therefore, for any nonzero ao ∈ Ao, there exists a nonzero
α ∈ R such that ao = α ·Hsyo. Furthermore, Hsyo = Hoy
implies that
ao = α ·Hoy. (23)
In addition, H¯y = 0 implies that the attack that modifies the
data from C by adding the corresponding entries of ao to the
actual data is equivalent to using α ·Hy as an attack vector,
which is unobservable. So, the attack is unobservable.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
The normalized residues in the first iteration are affected by
the attack a as follows:
r˜ = ΩW(z+ a) = ΩWe+ΩWa, (24)
which can be derived from (7) and (11). Note that (ΩWe)i
follows a standard normal distribution (due to the normaliza-
tion) if {i} is not a critical set; (ΩWe)i is zero otherwise.
Therefore, r˜i follows the normal distribution N ((ΩWa)i, 1)
if {i} is not a critical set; otherwise, r˜i is equal to (ΩWa)i.
Therefore, the expected energy of the normalized residues
at SF in the presence of the attack a is
E
[∑
i∈SF
(r˜i)
2
]
=
∑
i∈SF
(ΩWa)2i +C = ‖ISFΩWa‖
2
2+C, (25)
where C is the number of sensors in SF that do not form a
single element critical set.
Consequently, a solution to (17) is also a solution to the
following problem, and vice versa:
maxa ‖ISFΩWa‖
2
2
subj. ‖a‖22 = 1, a ∈ R(H1) ∩A, (26)
The theorem statements follow from the following observa-
tions: W is equal to W˜ as both are orthogonal projections on
the same space, and R(H1) is equivalent to R(U1).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Let H¯ denote the submatrix of H obtained by removing the
rows corresponding to the sensors in C. First, from the proof
procedure of Theorem 3.2, one can derive that the dimension
of N(H¯) is one. This implies that C contains exactly one
critical set. Because, if there were more than one critical sets
included in C, N(H¯) should have a dimension larger than one.
Because SA ∪ SF = C contains exactly one critical set, the
dimension of R(H1) ∩ A in (17) is one. This can be seen
as follows. The dimension of R(H1) ∩ A in (17) is equal to
the dimension of N(H2) where H2 is the matrix obtained
from H by removing the rows corresponding to the sensors
in SA ∪ SF. And, the fact that SA ∪ SF contains exactly one
critical set implies that the rank of H2 is n− 1, and thus the
dimension of N(H2) is 1.
Therefore, (17) has only two feasible points, and they give
the same objective function values. In particular, a solution to
(17) is the direction given by H1∆x where ∆x is a nonzero
vector in N(H2) (see [23] for more detailed arguments.)
The first and second conditions of Theorem 3.2, which are
assumed to hold, imply that the dimension of N(U¯A) is one.
In addition, it can be seen from Corollary 3.2.1 that the second
statement is true for a∗ = H1∆x and some nonzero α.
APPENDIX F
POWER GRID MEASUREMENT MODEL AND OBSERVABILITY
In this section, we briefly describe the power system mea-
surement model and the spanning-tree observability criterion
in [19]. The spanning-tree observability criterion results in
Corollary 3.2.2 from Theorem 3.2. For more details about
power system models, see [26].
The power system state is defined as the vector of voltage
magnitudes and phase angles at all buses except a reference
bus, which is an arbitrary bus whose voltage phase angle is
set to zero:
x = [V1 V2 · · · Vn θ2 · · · θn]
T (27)
11
where Vi and θi denote the voltage magnitude and phase angle
at bus i respectively, and bus 1 is set as the reference bus.
We consider two types of legacy sensors: line flow sensors
and bus injection sensors6. The line flow from bus i to bus j
is a complex quantity related to the system state by
Pij + j ·Qij = Viejθi ·
(
Vie
jθi − Vjejθj
Zij
)∗
(28)
where Pij ∈ R and Qij ∈ R are real and imaginary parts
of the line flow respectively, Zij is the impedance of the line
{i, j}, and X∗ denotes the complex conjugate of X . The bus
injection at bus i is the sum of all outgoing line flows from
bus i.
For computational benefits, the above nonlinear relation is
often linearized at the nominal operating point where all bus
voltage magnitudes are equal to 1 p.u., and all bus voltage
phase angles are equal to zero. This linearization decouples the
relation such that the real part of measurements depends only
on the voltage phase angles, and the imaginary part depends
only on the voltage magnitudes.
The linearized relation between the real part of mea-
surements and the voltage phase angles—the so-called DC
model—is often used to analyze power system observability.
In the DC model (4), the state x is defined as the vector of
voltage phase angles at all buses except the reference bus:
x = [θ2 θ3 · · · θn]
T . (29)
The measurement matrix H depends on the topology and line
impedance7.
The power system is observable if and only if H has full
column rank [19]. Verifying this rank condition seems to re-
quire knowledge of the line impedance. However, Krumpholz
et al. [19] showed that system observability can be determined
purely based on the topology and sensor locations. In particu-
lar, Krumpholz et al. [19] showed that a system is observable
if and only if there exists a way to assign each injection sensor
to any of the lines that are incident to the bus where the sensor
is located such that there exists a spanning tree of the topology
having at least one sensor (an assigned injection or line flow
sensor) on each edge of the tree (see Corollary 2 in [19].)
The spanning tree criterion can also be used to check
whether the state variables in Xo are observable with respect
to So (we use the notations in Section III-B.) Without loss of
generality, we assume that So contains an injection sensor on
the reference bus or a line flow sensor on a line incident to
the reference bus8. Then, we can simply apply the spanning
tree criterion to the reduced network for So (see Section III-B
for the definition of a reduced network.) The state variables
in Xo are observable with respect to So if and only if it is
6Other types of sensors (e.g., phasor measurement units) can also be
considered. We impose this restriction merely to facilitate clearer presentation.
7To describe the entries of H, we consider a noiseless measurement vector
z = Hx for simplicity. Suppose that the kth entry of z is a measurement
from a line flow sensor measuring the line flow from bus i to j. Then, if the
line is connected, zk = Bij(θi − θj), where Bij is the susceptance of the
line; if the line is not connected, zk = 0. In case that zk corresponds to an
injection sensor at bus i, zk is the sum of all the outgoing line flows from
bus i.
8Note that we can choose the reference bus such that this condition holds.
possible to assign injection sensors in So to their neighboring
lines such that a spanning tree of the reduced network with at
least one sensor in So on every edge exists.
REFERENCES
[1] E. A. Lee, “Cyber physical systems: Design challenges,”
EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley, Tech.
Rep. UCB/EECS-2008-8, Jan 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-8.html
[2] Y.-F. Huang, S. Werner, J. Huang, N. Kashyap, and V. Gupta, “State
estimation in electric power grids: Meeting new challenges presented by
the requirements of the future grid,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine,
vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 33–43, Sept 2012.
[3] A. Cardenas, S. Amin, B. Sinopoli, A. Giani, A. Perrig, and S. S.
Sastry, “Challenges for securing cyber physical systems,” in Workshop
on Future Directions in Cyber-physical Systems Security. DHS, July
2009.
[4] J. Hull, H. Khurana, T. Markham, and K. Staggs, “Staying in control:
Cybersecurity and the modern electric grid,” IEEE Power and Energy
Magazine, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 41–48, 2012.
[5] “Vulnerability Analysis of Energy Delivery Control Systems,” Idaho
National Laboratory, September 2011, INL/EXT-10-18381.
[6] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, 2009, pp. 21–32.
[7] R. B. Bobba, K. M. Rogers, Q. Wang, H. Khurana, K. Nahrstedt,
and T. J. Overbye, “Detecting false data injection attacks on dc state
estimation,” in First Workshop on Secure Control Systems,CPSWEEK
2010, Stockholm, Sweeden, Apr 2010.
[8] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. J. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Malicious data attacks
on the smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp.
645 –658, Dec. 2011.
[9] T. Kim and H. Poor, “Strategic protection against data injection attacks
on power grids,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 2, pp.
326 –333, june 2011.
[10] S. Bi and Y. Zhang, “Defending mechanisms against false-data injection
attacks in the power system state estimation,” in 2011 IEEE GLOBE-
COM Workshops, Houston, TX, USA., Dec 2011.
[11] A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, M. McQueen, P. Khargonekar, and
K. Poolla, “Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and
countermeasures,” in 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart
Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), Oct 2011, pp. 232–237.
[12] J. Kim and L. Tong, “On phasor measurement unit placement against
state and topology attacks,” in IEEE International Conference on Smart
Grid Communications, Oct. 2013.
[13] M. Esmalifalak, H. Nguyen, R. Zheng, and Z. Han, “Stealth false data
injection using independent component analysis in smart grid,” in IEEE
International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, Oct. 2011,
pp. 244–248.
[14] M. Rahman and H. Mohsenian-Rad, “False data injection attacks with
incomplete information against smart power grids,” in IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2012.
[15] P. Stoica and A. Nehorai, “Music, maximum likelihood, and cramer-rao
bound,” IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing,
vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 720–741, 1989.
[16] A. Pezeshki, B. Van Veen, L. Scharf, H. Cox, and M. Nordenvaad,
“Eigenvalue beamforming using a multirank mvdr beamformer and
subspace selection,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 56,
no. 5, pp. 1954–1967, 2008.
[17] M. Viberg, “Subspace-based methods for the identification of linear
time-invariant systems,” Automatica, vol. 31, no. 12, pp. 1835 – 1851,
1995.
[18] “Power Systems Test Case Archive.” [Online]. Available:
http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/
[19] G. R. Krumpholz, K. A. Clements, and P. W. Davis, “Power system
observability: a practical algorithm using network topology,” IEEE
Trans. Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 1534–1542,
July 1980.
[20] A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, M. McQueen, P. Khargonekar, and
K. Poolla, “Smart grid data integrity attacks,” IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1244–1253, Sept 2013.
[21] J. Kim and L. Tong, “On topology attack of a smart grid: undetectable
attacks and countermeasures,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 31, no. 7, July 2013.
12
[22] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira, and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices
for state estimators in power networks,” in First Workshop on Secure
Control Systems,CPSWEEK 2010, Stockholm, Sweeden, Apr 2010.
[23] J. Kim, L. Tong, and R. J. Thomas, “Data Framing Attack on State
Estimation,” ArXiv e-prints, arXiv:1310.7616, Apr. 2014, to appear
in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
[24] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “False data injection attacks in control systems,”
in First Workshop on Secure Control Systems, CPS Week, 2010.
[25] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, Nov 2013.
[26] A. Abur and A. G. Expo´sito, Power System State Estimation: Theory
and Implementation. CRC, 2000.
[27] L. Jia, J. Kim, R. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Impact of data quality on real-
time locational marginal price,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 627–636, March 2014.
[28] E. Handschin, F. C. Schweppe, J. Kohlas, and A. Fiechter, “Bad
data analysis for power system state estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power
Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-94, no. 2, pp. 329–337, Mar/Apr 1975.
[29] A. Srivastava, “A Bayesian Approach to Geometric Subspace Estima-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1390–
1400, May 2000.
[30] S. T. Smith, “Covariance, Subspace, and Intrinsic Cramer Rao Bounds,”
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 1610–1630,
May 2005.
